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Abstract 
 
I assess the role of wealth and systemic risk in explaining future asset returns. I show 
that the residuals of the trend relationship among asset wealth and human wealth predict 
both stock returns and government bond yields. Using data for a set of industrialized 
countries, I find that when the wealth-to-income ratio falls, investors demand a higher 
risk premium for stocks. As for government bond returns: (i) when they are seen as a 
component of asset wealth, investors react in the same manner; (ii) if, however, 
investors perceive the increase in government bond returns as signalling a future rise in 
taxes or a deterioration of public finances, then investors interpret the fall in the wealth-
to-income ratio as a fall in future bond premia. Finally, I show that the occurrence of 
crises episodes (in particular, systemic crises) amplifies the transmission of housing 
market shocks to financial markets and the banking sector. 
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1. Introduction 
The sudden occurrence of the current crisis, its severity and potentially long-
lasting effects, became key elements for understanding the impact of external 
influences, oil prices, private investment, stock markets or even duration dependence on 
the likelihood of an expansion and contraction ending (Castro, 2009). 
A prompt answer from monetary policy and large fiscal stimulus have also 
become important ingredients of the attempt to recover economic activity. Notably, 
these interventions pose major challenges because they represent an valuable test to the 
long-term (un)sustainability of public accounts.
1
 Moreover, they may cause business 
cycle de-synchronization (Rafiq and Mallick, 2008; Mallick and Mohsin, 2007, 2010) 
or impinge on the nexus between monetary stability and financial stability (Castro, 
2008; Granville and Mallick, 2009; Sousa, 2010a). 
The behaviour of asset markets is indeed of major importance for financial 
institutions, homeowners, monetary authorities and policy makers. In addition, the 
linkages between the financial markets and the banking system, the housing sector, and 
the monetary framework have emerged very strongly in the course of the financial 
turmoil. Not surprisingly, the relationship between macroeconomic variables, wealth, 
and long-term predictability of stock returns has revived the interest on the topic by 
academics (Sousa, 2010b).  
The current paper addresses the role of wealth in analysing predictability of both 
stock and government bond returns for a set of industrialized countries. Specifically, I 
                                                 
1
 In this context, Gabriel and Sangduan (2010a, 2010b) develop a Markov-switching cointegration 
framework that assesses long-run fiscal sustainability and allows to simultaneously determine the 
presence of fiscal regimes and analyze the timing of their transition. Ahmed and Rogers (1995) also 
analyze the issue of sustainability of public finances by looking at the cointegration between government 
spending and revenue. 
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assess the forecasting power of the ratio of asset wealth to human wealth for expected 
future returns. 
The rationale behind this linkage lies on the fact that a decrease in asset wealth 
reduces the value of collateral and increases household exposure to idiosyncratic risk. 
Consequently, a decrease in that ratio predicts higher stock returns and increases and 
leads to a higher risk premium. As for government bond returns, first one needs to 
understand the way government debt is perceived by the agents. If government bonds 
are seen as a component of asset wealth, then investors demand a higher bond risk 
premium when they face a fall in the ratio of wealth. If, however, the issuance of 
government debt is understood to lead to an increase of future taxes or is seen as a 
symptom of public finance deterioration, then investors will interpret the fall in the 
housing wealth-to-income ratio as a fall in future government bond returns. 
I show that the ratio of housing wealth to income, rwy, predicts both stock and 
government bond returns, which, therefore, highlights the characteristic of housing 
wealth as providing collateral to the banking system. It also emphasizes the important 
channel by which shocks originated in the housing market are transmitted to risk 
premium in asset markets. The empirical findings suggest that the predictive power is 
particularly important for horizons spanning from 4 to 6 quarters. 
Then, I focus on importance of composition of asset wealth in the context of 
forecasting asset returns in a similar fashion as Sousa (2010b). The author shows that 
consumption reacts differently by category of asset wealth and that it is more sensitive 
to changes in financial wealth than to changes in housing wealth. Therefore, I assess the 
potential role of financial wealth as providing collateral services, namely, by assessing 
the forecasting power of the ratio of aggregate wealth (that is, the sum of housing and 
financial wealth) to income, wy, for both stock returns and government bond yields. 
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The predictive power of the rwy and wy measures for real stock returns is 
substantial, ranging between 31% (UK), 20% (Belgium), and 11% (Ireland), and 10% 
(Finland and the US) over the next 4 quarters. As for Japan and Spain, those proxies do 
not seem to capture well the time-variation in stock returns. 
In what concerns government bond returns, the analysis suggests that one can 
cluster the set of countries in two groups. In the first group (which includes Australia, 
Finland and Netherlands), both rwy and wy have an associated coefficient with negative 
sign in the forecasting regressions. This, therefore, corroborates the idea that 
government debt is seen as part of the investor’s asset wealth. In the second group 
(which includes Germany and Italy), the forecasting regressions show that both rwy and 
wy have an associated coefficient that is positive. Consequently, agents in these 
countries perceive the rise in government bond returns rather as a deterioration of public 
finances and as signalling an increase in future taxation.  
Finally, I ask about the importance of episodes of crises in amplifying the 
transmission of shocks in the housing market to the financial system. In particular, I 
assess whether the occurrence of systemic versus non-systemic crises can help 
improving our understanding about the linkages between housing and financial markets. 
I show that the predictive power of future asset returns is indeed improved when one 
takes into account the presence of crises episodes, specially, the systemic ones. 
The robustness of the results is analysed in several directions. In fact, I show 
that: (i) the inclusion of additional control variables does not change the predictive 
power of rwy and wy; and (ii) models that include rwy and wy perform better than the 
autoregressive and the constant expected returns benchmark models. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
predictability of asset returns. Section 3 describes the theoretical approach. Section 4 
 5 
presents the estimation results of the forecasting regressions for stock returns and 
government bond yields. Section 5 provides the robustness analysis. Section 6 analyses 
the role of systemic risk in the amplification of the strength between the linkages among 
housing market developments and financial markets. Finally, in Section 7, I conclude 
and discuss the implications of the findings. 
 
2. Literature review 
The current financial turmoil has revealed the strength of the linkages between 
the housing market, the banking sector, and the financial system. 
In rich countries, private credit is offered not only by deposit money banks (as it 
happens in the case of developing countries), but also by banks and other financial 
institutions such as development banks, insurance companies, and private pension 
funds, private and public corporate bond and public equity markets.  
Given that a bank cannot be certain about a borrower’s ability and perfect 
monitoring of the borrower’s effort is costly, it is often forced to design contracts in 
order to achieve the first-best outcome (Ebrahim and Mathur, 2006). However, when 
collateral is scarce and contract enforcement is weak, the optimal allocation - where 
low-risk entrepreneurs pay a low interest rate and high-risk individuals pay a high 
interest rate – and pricing of loans (Greenbaum et al., 1989) is not achievable and credit 
is rationed or credit risk is affected (Jiménez and Saurina, 2004). 
The efficiency of the housing finance system is also of key interest to financial 
institutions, homeowners, and policy makers, and Cole et al. (2008) highlight the 
relationship between bank stock returns and economic growth. Liquidity and 
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collateralizable wealth play, therefore, a major role for asset pricing.
2
 First, liquidity 
shocks are positively correlated with shocks to returns. Second, assets have higher 
expected returns when they are positively correlated with aggregate market liquidity 
(Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003). Third, assets with high transaction costs or ililiquid 
assets normally trade at a discount (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). 
In this section, I review the literature on the predictability of stock returns and 
government bond returns, in particular, by highlighting the works that focus on the 
linkages between wealth and asset returns.
3
 
 
2.1. Predictability of stock returns 
Risk premium is generally considered as reflecting the ability of an asset to 
insure against consumption fluctuations. The empirical evidence has, however, shown 
that the covariance of returns across portfolios and contemporaneous consumption 
growth is not sufficient to justify the differences in expected returns. In fact, the 
literature on asset pricing has concluded that inefficiencies of financial markets (Fama 
and French, 1996), the rational response of agents to time-varying investment 
opportunities that is driven by variation in risk aversion and in the joint distribution of 
consumption and asset returns (Duffee, 2005).  
Different economically motivated variables have been, therefore, developed to 
capture time-variation in expected returns and document long-term predictability. Lettau 
and Ludvigson (2001) show that the transitory deviation from the common trend in 
                                                 
2
 Beltratti and Morana (2010) analyze the importance of house prices in explaining macroeconomic 
fluctuations, while Koetter and Poghosyan (2010) look at its role for bank stability. 
3
 In this context, Guo (2006) assesses the issue of time-variation in risk premium for stocks at the cross-
sectional dimension, while Kessler and Scherer (2009) focus on international bond markets. Additionally, 
Priestley (2001) looks at time-variation of persistence in expected returns. 
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consumption, aggregate wealth and labour income is a strong predictor of stock returns. 
Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) highlight the importance of housing in shifting 
the conditional distribution of asset prices and consumption growth. Yogo (2006) and 
Piazzesi et al. (2007) emphasize the role of non-separability of preferences and 
Fernandez-Corugedo et al. (2007) focus on the relative price of durable goods.  
 
2.2. Predictability of bond returns 
In contrast with the literature on the predictability of stock returns, there are just 
a few studies that try to explain the factors undermining bond risk premia. Fama and 
Bliss (1987) show that the spread between the n-year forward rate and the one-year 
yield can forecast the n-year excess bond returns. Campbell and Shiller (1991) find that 
excess bond returns can be predicted by the Treasury yield spreads. More recently, 
Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) suggest that a single tent-shaped linear combination of 
forward rates explains up to 44% of the variation in next year’s excess returns on bonds 
with maturities ranging from one to five years. Ludvigson and Ng (2009) find marked 
countercyclical variation in bond risk premia. 
While these findings imply that bond risk premium is time-varying, they are, in 
general, silent regarding its relationship with macroeconomic magnitudes. Moreover, 
they tend to find that excess bond returns can be forecasted not by wealth aggregates or 
macroeconomic variables such as consumption or inflation, but rather by pure financial 
indicators such as forward spreads and yield spreads. 
 
 8 
3. Theoretical framework and empirical approach 
3.1. Wealth and risk premium 
I assume that there is a continuum of agents who consume nondurable 
consumption, tc , and wealth services  (for instance, liquidity or collateral services), tw , 
and are endowed with stochastic labor income, ),( ttt aiy , where it represents the 
idiosyncratic event and at denotes the aggregate event. 
The household maximizes utility, that is 
,))(),(()|(),(
0| 0
0



ss t
ttttt
t
t
swscusspwcU     (1) 
where   is the time discount factor, ts  represents the state of the economy, )|( 0ssp t  
denotes the probability of state ts  given the initial state 0s , and preferences are 
specified by 
  ),1/(),( )1/()1(/)1(/)1(     tttt wcwcu   (2) 
where  >0 captures the importance of wealth in the utility function, ε is the 
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between consumption and wealth services, and   
is the coefficient of risk aversion. 
The solvency constraints are restrictions on the value of the household’s 
consumption claim net of its labour income claim, that is: 
   ,)()()()( ttstttttts syswasc tt      (3) 
where )]([ tts sdt  represents the price of a claim to )( tt sd , and t  is the rental price of 
wealth services. 
The strength of the solvency constraints is determined by the ratio of asset 
wealth to human wealth (i.e., the wealth-to-income ratio), wy, 
   ./)( azaztt cwawy tt       (4) 
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where w
a
 and c
a
 correspond, respectively, to aggregate wealth and aggregate 
consumption.  
Equilibrium allocations and prices will depend on the consumption weight   as 
follows: 1) if the household does not switch to a state with a binding constraint, it is 
),(' tt s ; and 2) if it switches, then the new weight is the cutoff level ),( ttt ay . 
In order to obtain aggregate consumption, one integrates over the new household 
weights, that is, ),;(),(')( ttttt
a
t adsa     where );( tt a  represents the 
distribution over weights at the start of period t. The consumption share of an agent can 
then be represented as the ratio of his consumption weight to the aggregate consumption 
weight )(/)(),('),( t
a
tt
a
ttttt aacssc    and, similarly, for the wealth share of an 
agent ),(/)(),('),( t
a
tt
a
ttttt aawssw    
where )( t
a
t a  defines a nondecreasing stochastic process. 
As the ratio of wealth to income, wy, decreases, the cutoff levels for the 
consumption weights increase, )(/),( t
a
ttt aay  , and, if the consumer moves to a state 
where the constraint is binding, then the cutoff level for the consumption share equals 
the household’s labour income share. As a result, when the ratio of wealth to income 
decreases, the household’s exposure to income shocks increases and a higher risk 
premium is demanded. 
 
3.2. Wealth and labour income 
Log real per capita asset wealth (log w), and labour income (log y) are 
nonstationary. As a result, I estimate the following vector error correction model 
(VECM): 
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The K error correction terms allow one to eliminate the effect of regressor endogeneity 
on the distribution of the least-squares estimators of   ,,,1 . 
The components log (w) and log (y) are stochastically cointegrated and I impose 
the restriction that the cointegrating vector eliminates the deterministic trends, so that 
  tyw tt )log()log(  is stationary. Then, the ratio of wealth to income, wy, is 
measured as the deviation from the cointegration relationship:  
.)log()log(
^^^
  tywwy ttt
4
   (6) 
Finally, I estimate the ratio of the real estate wealth, rw, to income. As before, 
one considers the following vector error-correction model 
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from which the ratio of collateralizable wealth, rwy, is measured as: 
.)log()log(
^^^
  tyrwrwy ttt    (8) 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Data 
The data are quarterly, post-1960, and include sixteen countries (Australia, since 
1970:1; Austria, since 1978:2; Belgium, since 1980:2; Canada, since 1965:1; Denmark, 
since 1977:1; Finland, since 1979:1; France, since 1970:2; Germany, since 1965:1; 
                                                 
4
 The ratio of housing wealth to income is also measured by estimating the constant,  , and the trend,  , 
in the cointegrating relationship while imposing the restriction  = −1. However, the results do not 
significantly change. 
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Ireland, since 1975:4; Italy, since 1971:4; Japan, since 1965:1; the Netherlands, since 
1975:1; Spain, since 1978:1; Sweden, since 1977:1; the UK, since 1961:2; and the US, 
since 1965:1). It, therefore, cover the last 30 to 50 years of data. 
Labour income is approximated with compensation series of the NIESR 
Institute. In the case of the US, I follow Lettau and Ludvigson (2001). As for the UK, I 
follow Sousa (2010b). 
Wealth includes financial and housing wealth and data come from National 
Central Banks, the Eurostat, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the United 
Nation’s Bulletin of Housing Statistics for Europe and North America. 
Stock returns are computed using the share price index provided by the 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the dividend yield ratio provided by Datastream. The 10-year government bond yield 
data is also provided by the IFS of the IMF. 
The government finance data normally refers to the Central Government, 
therefore, with the exclusion of the Local and/or the Regional Authorities. It is typically 
disseminated through the monthly publications of the General Accounting Offices, 
Ministries of Finance, National Central Banks and National Statistical Institutes of the 
respective countries. The latest figures are also published in the Special Data 
Dissemination Standard (SDDS) section of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
website. 
Data for population are taken from OECD's Main Economic Indicators and 
interpolated from annual series.  
Finally, all series – with the obvious exceptions of stock returns and government 
bond yields - were deflated with consumption deflators, expressed in logs of per capita 
terms and seasonally adjusted. 
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4.2. The long-run relation 
I first use the augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Phillips-Perron tests to 
determine the existence of unit roots in the series and conclude that all the series are 
first-order integrated, I(1). Next, I analyze the existence of cointegration among the 
series, using the Engle-Granger methodology and find evidence that supports that 
hypothesis.
5
 Finally, I estimate the vector error-correction model (VECM) as expressed 
in (5) and (7).
6
 
Table 1.1 shows the estimates (ignoring coefficient estimates on the constant and 
the trend) for the shared trend among housing wealth and income. It can be seen that, 
with the exceptions of Canada, France and Spain, the long-run elasticity of housing 
wealth with respect to labour income is positive, implying that the two aggregate tend to 
share a positive long-run path. The table also presents the unit root tests to the residuals 
of the cointegration relationship based in the Engle-Granger methodology and shows 
that they are stationary (that is, one can reject the null of a unit root). 
Table 1.2 reports the estimates (ignoring coefficient estimates on the constant 
and the trend) for the shared trend among aggregate wealth and income. First, it shows 
that the coefficient associated to income in the cointegrating vection is statistically 
significant for all countries, therefore, giving rise to the linkage between aggregate 
wealth and income is economically meaningful. Second, the point estimates for income 
are positive (with the exception of Denmark) in accordance with the findings of Table 
1.1. This suggests that not only housing wealth but also financial wealth can be used as 
                                                 
5
 I also use the Johansen-Juselius and the Phillips-Ouliaris methodologies to detect cointegration and the 
results remain robust. 
6
 Gabriel (2003) discusses the joint use of stationarity and unit root tests in the case of cointegration. 
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collateral. Finally, the cointegration tests suggest that the residuals of the cointegration 
relationship among aggregate wealth and income are stationary. 
 
Table 1.1 – Cointegration estimations. 
 ^
  
ADF t-statistic Critical values 
Lags: 1 5% 10% 
Australia 1.89*** 
(2.57) 
-2.28 -1.94 -1.62 
Austria 27.75*** 
(4.62) 
-4.78 -1.94 -1.62 
Belgium 4.73*** 
(8.37) 
-4.85 -1.94 -1.62 
Canada -10.20*** 
(-2.93) 
-3.09 -1.94 -1.62 
Denmark 12.38*** 
(3.42) 
-2.22 -1.94 -1.62 
Finland 1.80*** 
(3.81) 
-3.18 -1.94 -1.62 
France -4.01*** 
(-2.95) 
-2.89 -1.94 -1.62 
Germany 0.54*** 
(2.87) 
-3.38 -1.94 -1.62 
Ireland 4.09*** 
(5.58) 
-2.77 -1.94 -1.62 
Italy 1.25*** 
(3.00) 
-3.32 -1.94 -1.62 
Japan 2.18*** 
(5.79) 
-2.74 -1.94 -1.62 
Netherlands 4.17*** 
(8.31) 
-3.64 -1.94 -1.62 
Spain -20.49* 
(-1.40) 
-1.95 -1.94 -1.62 
Sweden 4.63*** 
(3.47) 
-2.00 -1.94 -1.62 
UK 2.59*** 
(3.73) 
-2.10 -1.94 -1.62 
US 4.48*** 
(9.31) 
-2.30 -1.94 -1.62 
Notes: Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. *, **, *** - 
statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 1.2 – Cointegration estimations. 
 ^
  
ADF t-statistic Critical values 
Lags: 1 5% 10% 
Australia 1.73*** 
(3.72) 
-2.04 -1.94 -1.62 
Austria 7.52** 
(4.03) 
4.53 -1.94 -1.62 
Belgium 1.06** 
(2.05) 
-3.16 -1.94 -1.62 
Canada 2.89*** 
(4.11) 
-3.12 -1.94 -1.62 
Denmark -6.35* 
(1.87) 
-2.88 -1.94 -1.62 
Finland 2.17*** 
(12.53) 
-2.73 -1.94 -1.62 
France 1.04*** 
(3.05) 
-2.68 -1.94 -1.62 
Germany 0.63*** 
(2.76) 
-3.78 -1.94 -1.62 
Ireland 1.99*** 
(4.72) 
-2.51 -1.94 -1.62 
Italy 1.10*** 
(3.73) 
-3.55 -1.94 -1.62 
Japan 1.94*** 
(4.56) 
-2.38 -1.94 -1.62 
Netherlands 1.08** 
(1.92) 
-3.43 -1.94 -1.62 
Spain 4.60*** 
(4.71) 
-2.64 -1.94 -1.62 
Sweden 1.19* 
(1.56) 
-2.17 -1.94 -1.62 
UK 0.79* 
(1.36) 
-2.31 -1.94 -1.62 
US 0.53* 
(1.45) 
-2.06 -1.94 -1.62 
Notes: Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. *, **, *** - 
statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively. 
 
4.3. Forecasting stock returns 
Section 3 shows that transitory deviations from the long-run relationship among 
wealth and income, wyt, mainly reflect agents’ expectations of future changes in asset 
returns. Moreover, when I allow for real estate wealth to provide collateral services, I 
assess whether the deviations of real estate wealth from its trend relationship with 
income, rwy, help forecasting expected future returns. 
I look at real stock returns (denoted by SRt) for which quarterly data are 
available and should provide a good proxy for the non-human component of asset 
wealth. 
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Table 2.1 summarizes the forecasting power of rwyt for different horizons. It 
reports estimates from OLS regressions of the H-period real stock return, SRt+1 + … + 
SRt+H, on the lag of rwyt. Therefore, I estimate the following model: 
tt
H
h
ht rwySR   

 1
1
.    (9) 
It shows that rwyt is statistically significant for a large number of countries and 
the point estimate of the coefficient is large in magnitude. Moreover, its sign is: (i) 
negative and statistically significant for Australia, Germany, Finland, Italy and the UK; 
and (ii) positive and statistically significant for Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and the US. 
These results suggest that for the first set of countries, investors expect a fall in future 
stock returns when they observe a rise in the ratio of housing wealth to income. As for 
the second set of countries, investors forecast an increase in future stock returns when 
they observe a rise in the ratio of housing wealth to income. 
It can also be seen that the trend deviations explain an important fraction of the 
variation in future real returns (as described by the adjusted R
2
), in particular, at 
horizons spanning from 4 to 8 quarters. In fact, at the 4 quarter horizon, rwyt explains 
17% (Belgium), 10% (Australia and Sweden), 8% (Finland and the UK), 6% (US) and 
5% (Japan) of the real stock return. In contrast, its forecasting power is poor for 
countries such as Austria, Canada, France, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands and Spain. 
Table 2.2 reports the forecasting power of wyt for different horizons, and follows 
the estimation of the model: 
tt
H
h
ht wySR   

 1
1
    (10) 
In accordance with the findings for rwyt, it shows that wyt is statistically 
significant for almost all countries (with the exceptions of Japan and Spain), the point 
estimate of the coefficient is large in magnitude. Moreover, its sign is negative. These 
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results suggest that investors expect an increase in future stock returns when they face a 
fall in the aggregate wealth – income ratio. 
 
Table 2.1 – Real stock returns, estimated effect of rwy. 
 Forecast Horizon H 
1 2 3 4 8 
Australia -0.20*** 
(-2.61) 
[0.05] 
-0.40*** 
(-3.23) 
[0.13] 
-0.53*** 
(-3.58) 
[0.16] 
-0.64*** 
(-3.70) 
[0.10] 
-0.99*** 
(-3.83) 
[0.12] 
Austria 0.00 
(0.59) 
[0.00] 
0.00 
(0.43) 
[0.00] 
0.00 
(0.46) 
[0.00] 
0.00 
(0.20) 
[0.00] 
-0.02* 
(-1.92) 
[0.01] 
Belgium 0.17*** 
(2.92) 
[0.08] 
0.34*** 
(3.80) 
[0.12] 
0.49*** 
(4.28) 
[0.15] 
0.62*** 
(4.41) 
[0.17] 
0.93*** 
(4.71) 
 [0.16] 
Canada -0.00 
(-0.34) 
[0.00] 
-0.00 
(-0.13) 
[0.00] 
0.00 
(0.13) 
[0.00] 
0.01 
(0.36) 
[0.00] 
0.04 
(1.37) 
[0.02] 
Denmark 0.03*** 
(2.33) 
[0.03] 
0.05*** 
(2.76) 
[0.04] 
0.08*** 
(2.85) 
[0.04] 
0.11*** 
(3.18) 
[0.05] 
0.23*** 
(3.96) 
[0.11] 
Finland -0.11** 
(-2.07) 
[0.02] 
-0.25*** 
(-2.88) 
[0.05] 
-0.39*** 
(-3.12) 
[0.06] 
-0.52*** 
(-3.24) 
[0.08] 
-1.06*** 
(-3.53) 
[0.13] 
France -0.01 
(-0.43) 
[0.00] 
-0.03 
(-0.61) 
[0.00] 
-0.03 
(-0.51) 
[0.00] 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
[0.00] 
0.10 
(1.06) 
[0.01] 
Germany -0.27** 
(-2.38) 
[0.04] 
-0.56*** 
(-3.27) 
[0.06] 
-0.87*** 
(-4.03) 
[0.08] 
-1.18*** 
(-4.75) 
[0.11] 
-2.10*** 
(-7.39) 
[0.16] 
Ireland 0.04 
(0.87) 
[0.00] 
0.10 
(1.31) 
[0.01] 
0.15 
(1.53) 
[0.01] 
0.18 
(1.50) 
[0.01] 
0.02 
(0.10) 
[0.00] 
Italy -0.25** 
(2.14) 
[0.06] 
-0.41** 
(-2.07) 
[0.05] 
-0.47* 
(1.92) 
[0.04] 
-0.43 
(-1.63) 
[0.02] 
0.23 
(0.87) 
[0.00] 
Japan 0.08 
(1.20) 
[0.02] 
0.13 
(1.18) 
[0.02] 
0.17 
(1.22) 
[0.02] 
0.19 
(1.11) 
[0.02] 
0.07 
(0.31) 
[0.00] 
Netherlands 0.02 
(0.23) 
[0.00] 
0.00 
(0.04) 
[0.00] 
-0.03 
(-0.18) 
[0.00] 
-0.06 
(-0.30) 
[0.00] 
-0.28 
(-0.95) 
[0.01] 
Spain -0.01 
(-1.38) 
[0.02] 
-0.01 
(-1.24) 
[0.02] 
-0.01 
(-1.08) 
[0.01] 
-0.02 
(-0.98) 
[0.01] 
-0.01 
(-0.39) 
[0.00] 
Sweden 0.16*** 
(2.80) 
[0.07] 
0.29*** 
(3.27) 
[0.09] 
0.38*** 
(3.44) 
[0.09] 
0.47*** 
(3.65) 
[0.10] 
0.86*** 
(5.25) 
[0.18] 
UK -0.20* 
(-1.75) 
[0.06] 
-0.34* 
(-1.71) 
[0.06] 
-0.46* 
(-1.78) 
[0.08] 
-0.54* 
(-1.82) 
[0.08] 
-0.59** 
(-2.13) 
[0.05] 
US 0.16* 
(1.81) 
[0.03] 
0.33** 
(2.16) 
[0.04] 
0.45** 
(2.32) 
[0.05] 
0.62*** 
(2.71) 
[0.06] 
1.42*** 
(4.89) 
[0.16] 
Notes: Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. Adjusted R-square is 
reported in square brackets. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level 
respectively. 
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Table 2.2 – Real stock returns, estimated effect of wy. 
 Forecast Horizon H 
1 2 3 4 8 
Australia -0.22*** 
(2.65) 
[0.05] 
-0.45*** 
(-3.40) 
[0.09] 
-0.62*** 
(-3.80) 
[0.11] 
-0.77*** 
(-3.92) 
[0.12] 
-1.28*** 
(-4.81) 
[0.18] 
Austria -0.01 
(-0.79) 
[0.00] 
-0.02 
(-1.28) 
[0.01] 
-0.03 
(-1.55) 
[0.01] 
-0.05* 
(-1.86) 
[0.01] 
-0.15*** 
(-3.90) 
[0.06] 
Belgium -0.21** 
(-2.49) 
[0.07] 
-0.43*** 
(-3.79) 
[0.11] 
-0.65*** 
(5.31) 
[0.16] 
-0.89*** 
(-6.65) 
[0.20] 
-1.85*** 
(-10.42) 
[0.37] 
Canada -0.04 
(-0.92) 
[0.01] 
-0.08 
(-1.28) 
[0.01] 
-0.12 
(-1.47) 
[0.02] 
-0.15* 
(-1.67) 
[0.02] 
-0.27** 
(-1.98) 
[0.04] 
Denmark -0.03*** 
(-3.39) 
[0.04] 
-0.05*** 
(-4.39) 
[0.06] 
-0.08*** 
(-4.56) 
[0.07] 
-0.11*** 
(-5.09) 
[0.09] 
-0.24*** 
(-6.23) 
[0.19] 
Finland -0.21 
(-1.37) 
[0.02] 
-0.48* 
(-1.95) 
[0.04] 
-0.82*** 
(-2.56) 
[0.07] 
-1.17*** 
(-3.07) 
[0.10] 
-2.25*** 
(-5.20) 
[0.15] 
France -0.26*** 
(-2.59) 
[0.06] 
-0.51*** 
(-3.05) 
[0.09] 
-0.79*** 
(-3.67) 
[0.13] 
-1.08*** 
(-4.35) 
[0.17] 
-2.11*** 
(-7.07) 
[0.30] 
Germany -0.23** 
(-2.15) 
[0.03] 
-0.47*** 
(-2.99) 
[0.05] 
-0.78*** 
(-3.88) 
[0.09] 
-1.11*** 
(-4.82) 
[0.12] 
-2.10*** 
(-9.11) 
[0.20] 
Ireland -0.36*** 
(-2.53) 
[0.05] 
-0.64*** 
(-2.96) 
[0.06] 
-0.93 
(-3.38) 
[0.08] 
-1.24*** 
(-3.74) 
[0.11] 
-2.22*** 
(-5.17) 
[0.16] 
Italy -0.43*** 
(-2.55) 
[0.09] 
-0.72*** 
(-2.55) 
[0.09] 
-0.87*** 
(-2.50) 
[0.07] 
-0.88** 
(-2.32) 
[0.05] 
-0.17 
(-0.41) 
[0.00] 
Japan 0.03 
(0.37) 
[0.00] 
0.04 
(0.30) 
[0.00] 
0.05 
(0.32) 
[0.00] 
0.03 
(0.16) 
[0.00] 
-0.24 
(-1.19) 
[0.01] 
Netherlands -0.12** 
(-2.00) 
[0.03] 
-0.28*** 
(-3.15) 
[0.07] 
-0.48*** 
(-4.25) 
[0.12] 
-0.65*** 
(-4.93) 
[0.14] 
-1.31*** 
(-7.03) 
[0.24] 
Spain 0.03 
(0.35) 
[0.00] 
0.02 
(0.20) 
[0.00] 
0.01 
(0.09) 
[0.00 
0.02 
(0.13) 
[0.00] 
-0.10 
(-0.47) 
[0.00] 
Sweden -0.34*** 
(-2.94) 
[0.09] 
-0.68*** 
(-3.84) 
[0.14] 
-0.94*** 
(-4.16) 
[0.17] 
-1.15*** 
(-4.39) 
[0.18] 
-2.05*** 
(-5.59) 
[0.29] 
UK -0.28*** 
(-3.70) 
[0.13] 
-0.54*** 
(-4.10) 
[0.19] 
-0.79*** 
(-4.51) 
[0.27] 
-0.98*** 
(-4.73) 
[0.31] 
-1.49*** 
(-5.43) 
[0.22] 
US -0.16*** 
(-3.63) 
[0.05] 
-0.30*** 
(-3.91) 
[0.10] 
-0.43*** 
(-4.13) 
[0.09] 
-0.55*** 
(-4.45) 
[0.10] 
-1.06*** 
(-5.35) 
[0.17] 
Notes: Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. Adjusted R-square is 
reported in square brackets. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level 
respectively. 
 
The trend deviation, wyt, explains 31% (UK), 20% (Belgium), 18% (Sweden), 
17% (France), 14% (Netherlands), 12% (Australia and Germany), 11% (Ireland), and 
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10% (Finland and the US) of stock returns over the next 4 quarters. Its forecasting 
power is poor for Japan and Spain. 
Noticeably, it is important to emphasize that, in general, wyt performs better than 
rwyt, also in accordance with the findings of Sousa (2010b), reflecting the ability of wyt 
to track the changes in the composition of asset wealth. Portfolios with different 
compositions of assets are subject to different taxation, transaction costs or degrees of 
liquidity: for example, agents who hold portfolios where the exposure to housing wealth 
is larger bear an additional risk associated with the (il)liquidity of these assets and the 
high transaction costs involved in trading them up or down. Wealth composition is, 
therefore, an important source of risk that wyt - but not rwyt - is able to explain. 
Moreover, it highlights that financial wealth – and not only housing wealth - can 
provide important collateral services to investors. 
 
4.4. Forecasting government bond returns 
I now look at the power of rwyt (Table 3.1) and wyt (Table 3.2) in predicting 
bond returns (proxied by the government bond yields and denoted by BRt) for which 
quarterly data are available. As mentioned before, one needs to keep in mind that, in 
contrast with stocks, an increase in government debt (in particular, in the government 
bond return) may not be seen as a rise in wealth, but may be perceived as a mere signal 
of a future increase in taxes. As a result: (i) when agents see government debt as a 
component of wealth, one should expect a negative point coefficient for rwyt and/or wyt 
in the forecasting regressions for government bond yields; and (ii) when investors 
interpret the rise in government debt as a signal of future tax rises, deviations in the 
long-term trend among housing wealth and income (rwyt) or in the long-term trend 
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among aggregate wealth and income (wyt) should be positively related to future 
government bond returns. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the forecasting power of rwyt for different horizons. It 
reports estimates from OLS regressions of the H-period real government bond return, 
BRt+1 + … + BRt+H, on the lag of rwyt, as described by the model: 
tt
H
h
ht rwyBR   

 1
1
.    (11) 
It shows that rwyt is statistically significant for almost all countries (with the 
exception of Austria) and the point estimate of the coefficient is large in magnitude. It 
can also be seen that the trend deviations explain an important fraction of the variation 
in future bond yields (as described by the adjusted R
2
), in particular, at horizons 
spanning from 4 to 8 quarters. In fact, at the 4 quarter horizon, rwyt explains In fact, at 
the 4 quarter horizon, wyt explains 49% (Spain), 29% (US), 28% (Belgium), 13% 
(Finland), 12% (Ireland), and 11% (Germany and Netherlands) of the bond returns.  
Interestingly the results suggest that the sign of the coefficient of rwyt is negative 
for Australia, Finland, Netherlands and Spain and positive for Belgium, Canada, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the US. This piece of evidence 
corroborates the idea that government debt is seen as part of investor’s wealth for the 
first set of countries: in the outcome of a fall in the ratio of housing wealth to income, 
agents allow consumption to rise because they expect yields to increase in the future. As 
for the second set of countries, agents perceive the rise in government bond returns as a 
deterioration of the public finances and an increase in future taxation. As a result, they 
reduce consumption when they observe a rise in the ratio of housing wealth to income.  
In practice, these results largely reflect higher sustainability of public finances in 
the first set of countries. In the case of the second set of countries, they characterize well 
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the relatively frequent swings in public deficits and government debt and the concerns 
about the long-term sustainability of public finances.  
Table 3.2 summarizes the results from forecasting regressions of wyt for 
different horizons, where I estimate the following model: 
tt
H
h
ht wyBR   

 1
1
.    (12) 
It shows that wyt is statistically significant for virtually all countries. The point estimate 
of the coefficient is large in magnitude and wyt explains an important fraction of the 
variation in future real government bond yields: at the 4 quarter horizon, wyt explains 
39% (Australia), 38% (Netherlands), 33% (Belgium), 28% (Finland, Sweden and US), 
20% (Denmark), 13% (Germany), 12% (Japan), and 10% (Spain) of government bond 
returns. As for Austria and Ireland, the forecasting power of wyt is virtually nil. 
The results also suggest that the sign of the coefficient of wyt is positive for 
Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan and Spain, therefore, indicates that agents 
reduce consumption when they expect a rise of government bond returns. In this case, a 
rise in government bond yields is perceived as a signal of deterioration of public 
finances, so agents believe in the Ricardian equivalence. As for Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Finland, France, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and US, the sign of the coefficient 
of wyt is negative and supports the idea that government debt is considered a component 
of wealth in this set of countries. 
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Table 3.1 – Real bond returns, estimated effect of rwy. 
 Forecast Horizon H 
1 2 3 4 8 
Australia -0.05** 
(-1.96) 
[0.03] 
-0.11** 
(-1.95) 
[0.03] 
-0.16* 
(-1.94) 
[0.03] 
-0.21** 
(-1.96) 
[0.03] 
-0.38*** 
(-1.87) 
[0.03] 
Austria -0.00 
(-0.30) 
[0.00] 
-0.00 
(-1.62) 
[0.01] 
-0.00 
(-1.24) 
[0.01] 
-0.00 
(-1.26) 
[0.01] 
0.00 
(0.07) 
[0.00] 
Belgium 0.11*** 
(6.62) 
[0.25] 
0.22*** 
(6.92) 
[0.28] 
0.32*** 
(6.92) 
[0.28] 
0.43*** 
(6.92) 
[0.28] 
0.80*** 
(6.65) 
[0.27] 
Canada 0.01*** 
(3.12) 
[0.05] 
0.02*** 
(3.46) 
[0.06] 
0.02*** 
(3.81) 
[0.07] 
0.04*** 
(4.22) 
[0.08] 
0.09*** 
(6.02) 
[0.14] 
Denmark -0.01 
(-1.12) 
[0.01] 
-0.03 
(-1.29) 
[0.01] 
-0.05 
(-1.50) 
[0.02] 
-0.07* 
(-1.72) 
[0.02] 
-0.18** 
(-2.32) 
[0.03] 
Finland -0.10*** 
(-4.37) 
[0.09] 
-0.21*** 
(-5.25) 
[0.11] 
-0.32*** 
(-5.73) 
[0.12] 
-0.43*** 
(-5.95) 
[0.13] 
-0.91*** 
(-6.68) 
[0.15] 
France 0.01** 
(2.35) 
[0.03] 
0.03** 
(2.36) 
[0.03] 
0.04** 
(2.36) 
[0.03] 
0.05** 
(2.31) 
[0.03] 
0.10** 
(2.26) 
[0.03] 
Germany 0.05*** 
(2.70) 
[0.03] 
0.12*** 
(4.07) 
[0.06] 
0.20*** 
(4.90) 
[0.08] 
0.30*** 
(5.78) 
[0.11] 
0.81*** 
(9.42) 
[0.26] 
Ireland 0.08*** 
(4.63) 
[0.11] 
0.17*** 
(4.59) 
[0.11] 
0.25*** 
(4.57) 
[0.12] 
0.34*** 
(4.61) 
[0.12] 
0.79*** 
(5.30) 
[0.17] 
Italy 0.05** 
(2.01) 
[0.02] 
0.08* 
(1.79) 
[0.02] 
0.10 
(1.50) 
[0.01] 
0.11 
(1.18) 
[0.01] 
0.04 
(0.22) 
[0.00] 
Japan 0.05 
(0.96) 
[0.02] 
0.10 
(1.38) 
[0.03] 
0.14** 
(2.15) 
[0.06] 
0.17*** 
(3.41) 
[0.09] 
0.32*** 
(3.25) 
 [0.09] 
Netherlands -0.06*** 
(-3.04) 
[0.08] 
-0.13*** 
(-3.94) 
[0.11] 
-0.20*** 
(-4.07) 
[0.11] 
-0.25*** 
(-3.90) 
[0.11] 
-0.46*** 
(-3.59) 
[0.10] 
Spain -0.02*** 
(-7.69) 
[0.44] 
-0.03*** 
(7.61) 
[0.46] 
-0.05*** 
(-7.98) 
[0.47] 
-0.06*** 
(-8.58) 
[0.49] 
-0.12*** 
(-10.57) 
[0.49] 
Sweden 0.04* 
(1.82) 
[0.03] 
0.05 
(1.62) 
[0.03] 
0.08* 
(1.84) 
[0.03] 
0.10** 
(2.20) 
[0.04] 
0.13 
(1.35) 
[0.02] 
UK 0.01 
(0.54) 
[0.00] 
0.03 
(0.77) 
[0.00] 
0.06 
(1.14) 
[0.01] 
0.10 
(1.46) 
[0.01] 
0.31*** 
(2.59) 
[0.03] 
US 0.21*** 
(7.44) 
[0.30] 
0.42*** 
(7.56) 
[0.31] 
0.63*** 
(7.60) 
[0.30] 
0.81*** 
(7.38) 
[0.29] 
1.41*** 
(6.28) 
[0.25] 
Notes: Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. Adjusted R-square is 
reported in square brackets. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level 
respectively. 
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Table 3.2 – Real bond returns, estimated effect of wy. 
 Forecast Horizon H 
1 2 3 4 8 
Australia -0.18*** 
(-8.17) 
[0.34] 
-0.36*** 
(-8.56) 
[0.36] 
-0.55*** 
(-8.89) 
[0.37] 
-0.74*** 
(-9.28) 
[0.39] 
-1.54*** 
(-10.80) 
[0.44] 
Austria 0.00 
(0.45) 
[0.00] 
0.00 
(0.28) 
[0.00] 
0.00 
(0.62) 
[0.00] 
0.01 
(0.95) 
[0.01] 
0.03** 
(1.97) 
[0.03] 
Belgium -0.16*** 
(-6.58) 
[0.32] 
-0.31*** 
(-6.78) 
[0.34] 
-0.45*** 
(-6.66) 
[0.33] 
-0.60*** 
(-6.64) 
[0.33] 
-1.16*** 
(-6.74) 
[0.34] 
Canada -0.04*** 
(-3.70) 
[0.07] 
-0.07*** 
(-3.60) 
[0.06] 
-0.11*** 
(-3.63) 
[0.06] 
-0.15*** 
(-3.72) 
[0.07] 
-0.40*** 
(-5.14) 
[0.13] 
Denmark 0.04*** 
(4.92) 
[0.13] 
0.08*** 
(6.11) 
[0.16] 
0.13*** 
(6.69) 
[0.18] 
0.18*** 
(7.23) 
[0.20] 
0.41*** 
(8.27) 
[0.27] 
Finland -0.29*** 
(-6.09) 
[0.24] 
-0.56*** 
(-7.21) 
[0.27] 
-0.84*** 
(-7.46) 
[0.28] 
-1.09*** 
(-7.35) 
[0.28] 
-2.04*** 
(-6.98) 
[0.27] 
France -0.04*** 
(2.66) 
[0.02] 
-0.08*** 
(-2.56) 
[0.02] 
-0.10*** 
(-2.42) 
[0.02] 
-0.13*** 
(-2.26) 
[0.01] 
-0.19*** 
(-1.90) 
[0.01] 
Germany 0.05*** 
(2.94) 
[0.04] 
0.12*** 
(4.23) 
[0.07] 
0.20*** 
(5.18) 
[0.10] 
0.29*** 
(5.97) 
[0.13] 
0.75*** 
(9.25) 
[0.27] 
Ireland -0.04 
(-0.79) 
[0.01] 
-0.08 
(-0.77) 
[0.01] 
-0.12 
(-0.79) 
[0.01] 
-0.16 
(-0.82) 
[0.01] 
-0.23 
(-0.59) 
[0.00] 
Italy 0.06** 
(1.96) 
[0.02] 
0.11* 
(1.78) 
[0.02] 
0.14 
(1.46) 
[0.01] 
0.15 
(1.14) 
[0.01] 
0.02 
(0.06) 
[0.00] 
Japan 0.05 
(0.79) 
[0.01] 
0.07 
(0.99) 
[0.02] 
0.14** 
(2.01) 
[0.06] 
0.21*** 
(3.71) 
[0.12] 
0.44*** 
(4.24) 
[0.14] 
Netherlands -0.09*** 
(-7.27) 
[0.36] 
-0.18*** 
(-8.32) 
[0.39] 
-0.27*** 
(-8.87) 
[0.39] 
-0.35*** 
(-9.03) 
[0.38] 
-0.63*** 
(-7.93) 
[0.32] 
Spain 0.06** 
(2.28) 
[0.07] 
0.13** 
(2.46) 
[0.08] 
0.20*** 
(2.61) 
[0.09] 
0.27*** 
(2.71) 
[0.10] 
0.56*** 
(2.67) 
[0.11] 
Sweden -0.14*** 
(-2.82) 
[0.08] 
-0.28*** 
(-4.71) 
[0.20] 
-0.39*** 
(-5.01) 
[0.22] 
-0.49*** 
(-6.01) 
[0.28] 
-0.96*** 
(-6.28) 
[0.27] 
UK -0.04* 
(-1.93) 
[0.03] 
-0.08** 
(-2.15) 
[0.03] 
-0.11** 
(-2.19) 
[0.03] 
-0.14** 
(-2.17) 
[0.03] 
-0.26** 
(-2.20) 
[0.03] 
US -0.13*** 
(-8.59) 
[0.27] 
-0.26*** 
(-8.60) 
[0.27] 
-0.38*** 
(-8.59) 
[0.27] 
-0.52*** 
(-8.84) 
[0.28] 
-1.15*** 
(-11.61) 
[0.36] 
Notes: Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. Adjusted R-square is 
reported in square brackets. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level 
respectively. 
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5. Robustness analysis 
5.1. Additional control variables 
In this Sub-section, I assess the robustness of the forecasting power of rwy and 
wy in the regressions of real stock returns and government bond yields.  
In what concerns stock returns, Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Jiang and Lee 
(2009) analyse the predictive power of the ratios of price to dividends or price to  
earnings for stock returns.  
As for government bond yields, Gale and Orszag (2003) argue that budget 
deficits may raise nominal interest rates, while Engen and Hubbard (2004) do not find a 
significant effect. Brandt and Wang (2003) and Lee (2010) argue that risk premia are 
driven by shocks to inflation, as well as by shocks to aggregate consumption. 
Table 4.1 reports the estimates from one-quarter ahead forecasting regressions 
that include the dividend yield ratio (DivYldt) as an additional variable. It displays only 
information for countries for which data on the dividend yield ratio is available.  
The results show that both the point coefficient estimates of rwy and wy and 
their statistical significance do not change with respect to the findings of Tables 2.1 and 
2.2 where only rwy and wy were included as explanatory variables. Moreover, the 
dividend yield ratio (DivYldt) seems to provide some relevant information about future 
asset returns: it is statistically significant in a large number of regressions.  
By its turn, Table 4.2 reports the estimates from one-quarter ahead forecasting 
regressions that include additional variables shown to contain predictive power for long-
term interest rates, in particular, the inflation rate (Inflation) and the deficit-to-GDP 
ratio (Deficit). 
The results show that both the point coefficient estimates of rwy and wy and 
their statistical significance do not change with respect to the findings of Tables 3.1 and 
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3.2 where only rwy and wy were included as explanatory variables. In addition, both the 
lag of the inflation rate and the lag of the deficit-to-GDP ratio bring some relevant 
information in forecasting bond returns. This, therefore, suggests that investors use 
government bonds to hedge against the risk of inflation. In addition, it reveals that an 
increase in the deficit-to-GDP ratio is associated with a rise in future government bond 
yields. 
 
Table 4.1 – Real stock returns: additional control variables. 
 rwyt-1 DivYldt-1 Adj. 
R-square 
wyt-1 DivYldt-1 Adj. 
R-square 
Australia -0.19** 
(2.34) 
5.55** 
(2.22) 
[0.08] -0.18 
(-1.37) 
2.55 
(0.56) 
[0.06] 
Austria 0.00 
(0.59) 
 [0.00] -0.01 
(-0.79) 
 [0.00] 
Belgium 0.12* 
(1.85) 
-0.43 
(-0.17) 
[0.04] -0.46*** 
(-3.47) 
-6.91** 
(-2.18) 
[0.11] 
Canada -0.00 
(-0.24) 
3.13 
(1.20) 
[0.01] -0.04 
(-1.02) 
3.45 
(1.30) 
[0.02] 
Denmark 0.03*** 
(2.33) 
 [0.03] -0.03*** 
(-3.39) 
 [0.04] 
Finland -0.22*** 
(-2.61) 
-1.65 
(-0.66) 
[0.05] -0.22 
(-1.34) 
1.01 
(0.34) 
[0.02] 
France -0.01 
(-0.33) 
1.28 
(0.70) 
[0.01] -0.27*** 
(-2.75) 
1.96 
(1.12) 
[0.07] 
Germany -0.68*** 
(-2.98) 
11.33*** 
(2.75) 
[0.11] -0.74*** 
(-3.58) 
12.23*** 
(2.67) 
[0.11] 
Ireland 0.04 
(0.87) 
 [0.00] -0.36*** 
(-2.53) 
 [0.05] 
Italy -0.23** 
(-2.02) 
20.48*** 
(3.20) 
[0.14] -0.27* 
(-1.83) 
16.71** 
(2.48) 
[0.10] 
Japan 0.01 
(0.12) 
9.94** 
(2.00) 
[0.04] -0.04 
(-0.52) 
10.88* 
(1.94) 
[0.03] 
Netherlands 0.73** 
(2.44) 
6.24 
(0.66) 
[0.15] 2.03*** 
(3.47) 
74.67*** 
(2.98) 
[0.19] 
Spain -0.01 
(-1.38) 
 [0.02] 0.03 
(0.35) 
 [0.00] 
Sweden 0.13** 
(2.46) 
12.48*** 
(2.73) 
[0.12] -0.25** 
(-2.15) 
10.44** 
(2.40) 
[0.13] 
UK -0.00 
(-0.01) 
3.60*** 
(-0.01) 
[0.03] -0.12 
(-1.51) 
1.85 
(1.03) 
[0.05] 
US 0.16* 
(1.68) 
-0.07 
(-0.04) 
[0.03] -0.15*** 
(-3.35) 
0.74 
(0.43) 
[0.05] 
Notes: Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. *, **, *** - statistically 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 4.2 – Real bond returns: additional control variables. 
 rwyt-1 Inflationt-1 Deficitt-1 Adj. 
R-square 
wyt-1 Inflationt-1 Deficitt-1 Adj. 
R-square 
Australia -0.05 
(-1.59) 
0.00 
(1.10) 
0.01 
(0.26) 
[0.03] -0.21*** 
(-9.89) 
-0.00 
(-2.94) 
-0.07 
(-1.54) 
[0.41] 
Austria -0.00 
(-0.35) 
0.00 
(0.85) 
 [0.01] 0.00 
(0.36) 
0.00 
(0.75) 
 [0.01] 
Belgium 0.04** 
(2.49) 
-0.00 
(-0.28) 
-0.11*** 
(-4.93) 
[0.49] -0.12*** 
(-6.04) 
-0.00 
(-1.05) 
-0.11*** 
(-7.44) 
[0.62] 
Canada -0.00 
(-0.51) 
0.00** 
(2.08) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
[0.07] -0.01 
(-0.24) 
0.00* 
(1.76) 
0.22 
(0.38) 
[0.06] 
Denmark -0.01 
(-1.15) 
0.01*** 
(5.41) 
 [0.16] 0.03*** 
(3.34) 
0.01*** 
(4.05) 
 [0.24] 
Finland -0.05* 
(-1.84) 
-0.00*** 
(-3.87) 
0.35*** 
(4.22) 
[0.20] -0.28*** 
(-4.67) 
-0.00 
(-0.78) 
0.04 
(0.42) 
[0.25] 
France 0.02*** 
(4.01) 
0.01*** 
(4.89) 
0.02 
(0.43) 
[0.30 -0.08*** 
(-5.36) 
0.01*** 
(4.88) 
-0.01 
(-0.18) 
[0.30] 
Germany 0.05** 
(2.47) 
0.00** 
(1.98) 
0.19** 
(2.02) 
[0.08] 0.05*** 
(2.72) 
0.00** 
(1.99) 
0.16* 
(1.77) 
[0.09] 
Ireland 0.05** 
(2.01) 
  [0.02] -0.04 
(-0.79) 
  [0.01] 
Italy 0.06*** 
(3.88) 
0.01*** 
(9.55) 
0.33*** 
(10.02) 
[0.77] 0.09*** 
(4.33) 
0.02*** 
(10.08) 
0.33*** 
(10.17) 
[0.78] 
Japan 0.04 
(0.47) 
0.01*** 
(4.67) 
3.53** 
(2.06) 
[0.31] 0.02 
(0.19) 
0.01*** 
(4.74) 
3.48* 
(1.97) 
[0.31] 
Netherlands -0.05*** 
(-2.59) 
0.00 
(1.33) 
0.22*** 
(5.83) 
[0.28] -0.08*** 
(-5.04) 
0.00* 
(1.85) 
0.10** 
(2.02) 
[0.40] 
Spain -0.01*** 
(-6.42) 
0.01** 
(2.19) 
0.29*** 
(3.11) 
[0.58] 0.06** 
(0.2.31) 
0.02** 
(2.48) 
0.39** 
(2.42) 
[0.34] 
Sweden 0.04 
(1.51) 
0.00 
(0.62) 
0.04 
(0.30) 
[0.03] -0.14** 
(-2.46) 
0.00 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(-0.12) 
[0.08] 
UK -0.01 
(-0.51) 
0.00*** 
(3.48) 
0.03 
(0.46) 
[0.13] -0.03 
(-1.57) 
0.00*** 
(3.53) 
0.01 
(0.17) 
[0.15] 
US 0.17*** 
(5.97) 
0.02*** 
(7.49) 
0.28 
(1.35) 
[0.52] -0.08*** 
(-3.44) 
0.01*** 
(3.72) 
0.57*** 
(2.66) 
[0.26] 
Notes: Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level 
respectively. 
 
5.2. Nested forecast comparisons 
 As a final robustness check, I make nested forecast comparisons, in which I 
compare the mean-squared forecasting error from a series of one-quarter-ahead out-of-
sample forecasts obtained from a prediction equation that includes either rwy or wy as 
the sole forecasting variables, to a variety of forecasting equations that do not include 
either rwy or wy. As a result, the unrestricted model nests the benchmark model. 
 I consider two benchmark models: the autoregressive benchmark and the 
constant expected returns benchmark. In the autoregressive benchmark, I compare the 
mean-squared forecasting error from a regression that includes just the lagged asset 
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return as a predictive variable to the mean-squared error from regressions that include, 
in addition, rwy or wy. In the constant expected returns benchmark, I compare the 
mean-squared forecasting error from a regression that includes a constant (as the only 
explanatory variable) to the mean-squared error from regressions that include, in 
addition, rwy or wy. 
 Table 5.1 summarizes the nested forecast comparisons for the equations of the 
real stock returns and the government bond yields using rwy. It shows that, in general, 
including rwy in the forecasting regressions improves over the benchmark models. This 
is particularly important when the benchmark model is the constant expected returns 
benchmark, and, therefore, supports the existence of time-variation in expected returns. 
 
Table 5.1 – One-quarter ahead forecasts of returns. 
rwy model vs. constant/AR models 
  Real stock returns Real bond returns 
MSErwy/MSEconstant MSErwy/MSEAR MSErwy/MSEconstant MSErwy/MSEAR 
Australia 0.978 0.980 0.988 1.004 
Austria 1.003 1.004 1.003 1.004 
Belgium 0.964 0.990 0.870 1.005 
Canada 1.003 1.004 0.979 1.000 
Denmark 0.990 0.995 1.000 1.005 
Finland 0.992 0.994 0.957 0.997 
France 1.003 1.003 0.988 1.004 
Germany 0.986 0.988 0.990 0.994 
Ireland 1.002 1.002 0.945 1.004 
Italy 0.976 0.992 0.994 1.003 
Japan 0.996 0.996 0.995 1.000 
Netherlands 1.005 1.004 0.962 1.005 
Spain 0.996 0.997 0.753 1.005 
Sweden 0.969 1.002 0.992 1.005 
UK 0.975 0.969 1.003 1.003 
US 0.991 0.997 0.842 0.997 
Notes: MSE – mean-squared forecasting error.  
 
Table 5.2 provides the nested forecast comparisons for the equations of real 
stock returns and the real government bond returns using wy. It can be seen that models 
that include wy generally have a lower mean-squared forecasting error. Moreover, the 
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ratios are smaller that the ones presented in Table 5.1, which constitutes evidence that 
wy is able to better predict both stock returns and government bond yields than rwy. 
 
Table 5.2 – One-quarter ahead forecasts of returns. 
wy model vs. constant/AR models 
  Real stock returns Real bond returns 
MSEwy/MSEconstant MSEwy/MSEAR MSEwy/MSEconstant MSEwy/MSEAR 
Australia 0.978 0.980 0.815 1.003 
Austria 1.003 1.003 1.002 1.004 
Belgium 0.971 0.950 0.828 1.002 
Canada 1.000 1.000 0.970 1.004 
Denmark 0.984 0.990 0.938 0.994 
Finland 0.995 0.993 0.874 1.002 
France 0.975 0.977 0.993 0.984 
Germany 0.989 0.991 0.984 0.998 
Ireland 0.980 0.980 1.003 0.992 
Italy 0.961 0.979 0.995 1.006 
Japan 1.003 1.003 0.997 1.001 
Netherlands 0.989 0.981 0.807 1.005 
Spain 1.007 1.008 0.972 0.999 
Sweden 0.960 0.930 0.964 0.974 
UK 0.939 0.930 0.988 0.997 
US 0.976 0.980 0.857 1.002 
Notes: MSE – mean-squared forecasting error. 
 
6. Does systemic risk matter? 
Financial crises can be contagious and damaging, and prompt quick policy 
responses, as they typically lead economies into recessions and sharp current account 
imbalances. Among the many causes of financial crises, one can refer: (i) credit booms; 
(ii) currency and maturity mismatches; (iii) large capital inflows; and (iv) unsustainable 
macroeconomic policies (large current account deficits and rising public debt). 
In order to deal with financial crises, governments have employed a broad range 
of policies, which reallocate wealth toward banks and debtors and away from taxpayers.  
Honohan and Laeven (2005) and Laeven and Valencia (2008) identify financial 
crises episodes, and systemic crisis includes currency, debt and banking crises. A 
systemic currency crisis corresponds to a nominal depreciation of the currency of at 
least 30% and, simultaneously, at least a 10% increase in the rate of depreciation 
compared to the year before. A systemic debt crisis describes a situation where there are 
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sovereign defaults to private lending and debt rescheduling programs. In a systemic 
banking crisis, there is a large number of defaults on corporate and financial sectors, 
non-performing loans increase sharply and, asset prices (equity and real estate prices) 
eventually depress, and real interest rates increase dramatically.  
 
6.1. Systemic crises 
In order to assess the importance of systemic crises, I estimate the following 
models: 
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where SystemicCrisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the presence of an 
episode of systemic crisis and 0 otherwise, and H refers to the number of ahead periods 
in the forecasting exercise. Given that the effects of systemic crises may not be 
immediate, I consider H=4, therefore, allowing for a time lag from the date of 
occurrence of the crisis and the emergence of its effects. 
 Table 6.1 reports the estimates from 4 quarters-ahead forecasting regressions. 
The results show that both the point coefficient estimates of rwy and wy and their 
statistical significance do not change with respect to the previous findings. Moreover, 
the coefficient associated with the interaction between rwy or wy and the dummy 
variable for the systemic crisis is, in general, statistically significant. In addition, it has a 
sign that is consistent with the one associated with rwy or wy, implying that the 
occurrence of a systemic crisis leads investors to demand a higher risk premium for 
stocks in the future.  
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By its turn, Table 6.2 reports the estimates from 4 quarters-ahead forecasting 
regressions, following the models: 
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The results suggest again that both the point coefficient estimates of rwy and wy 
and their statistical significance do not change with respect to the previous findings. 
Moreover, the coefficient associated with the interaction between rwy or wy and the 
dummy variable for the systemic crisis is, in general, statistically significant. In contrast 
with the case of stocks, it has an opposite sign with the one associated with rwy or wy, 
implying that the occurrence of a systemic crisis leads investors to demand a higher risk 
premium for government bonds as they interpret that situation as an increase of 
sovereign default. 
 
Table 6.1 – Real stock returns and systemic crises. 
 rwyt-1 rwyt-1 * 
SystemicCrisis 
Adj. 
R-square 
wyt-1 wyt-1 * 
SystemicCrisis 
Adj. 
R-square 
Australia -0.84*** 
(-4.15) 
0.972** 
(2.05) 
[0.13] -0.83*** 
(-4.02) 
0.83 
(1.05) 
[0.13] 
Austria  No episodes of systemic crisis  
Belgium  No episodes of systemic crisis  
Canada 0.01 
(0.43) 
-0.07 
(-0.76) 
[0.00] -0.13 
(-1.47) 
-0.42* 
(-1.79) 
[0.02] 
Denmark 0.17*** 
(2.60) 
-0.13 
(-1.56) 
[0.07] -0.11*** 
(-4.90) 
 [0.09] 
Finland  No episodes of systemic crisis  
France -0.01 
(-0.19) 
-4.45*** 
(-7.47) 
[0.01] -1.07** 
(-4.22) 
-1.17* 
(-1.84) 
[0.17] 
Germany -1.22*** 
(-4.45) 
0.38 
(0.92) 
[0.11] -1.11*** 
(-4.52) 
-0.03 
(-0.06) 
[0.12] 
Ireland  No episodes of systemic crisis  
Italy -0.46 
(-1.42) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
[0.02] -1.12** 
(-2.29) 
0.67 
(0.96) 
[0.06] 
Japan  No episodes of systemic crisis  
Netherlands  No episodes of systemic crisis  
Spain  No episodes of systemic crisis  
Sweden  No episodes of systemic crisis  
UK -1.10*** 
(-2.66) 
1.13** 
(2.18) 
[0.16] -1.26*** 
(-4.60) 
0.69* 
(1.93) 
[0.35] 
US -0.70*** 
(2.81) 
-0.96** 
(-2.09) 
[0.07] -0.53*** 
(-4.23) 
-0.73 
(-1.56) 
[0.11] 
Notes: Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. *, **, *** - statistically 
significant at the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively. 
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Table 6.2 – Real bond returns and systemic crises. 
 rwyt-1 rwyt-1 * 
SystemicCrisis 
Adj. 
R-square 
wyt-1 wyt-1 * 
SystemicCrisis 
Adj. 
R-square 
Australia -0.40*** 
(-3.71) 
0.97*** 
(4.40) 
[0.11] -0.81*** 
(-10.43) 
1.36*** 
(3.71) 
[0.45] 
Austria  No episodes of systemic crisis  
Belgium  No episodes of systemic crisis  
Canada 0.04*** 
(5.55) 
-0.38*** 
(-12.99) 
[0.26] -0.13*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.48*** 
(-2.60) 
[0.09] 
Denmark -0.24*** 
(-2.97) 
0.34*** 
(3.34) 
[0.09] 0.19*** 
(7.23) 
-0.12** 
(-2.05) 
[0.20] 
Finland  No episodes of systemic crisis  
France 0.05** 
(2.28) 
0.88* 
(1.88) 
[0.03] -0.14*** 
(-2.51) 
1.09*** 
(6.31) 
[0.03] 
Germany 0.28*** 
(4.99) 
0.21* 
(1.84) 
[0.12] 0.30*** 
(-5.53) 
-0.07 
(-0.43) 
[0.13] 
Ireland  No episodes of systemic crisis  
Italy 0.01 
(0.05) 
0.31 
(1.02) 
[0.02] -0.03 
(-0.10) 
0.51 
(1.11) 
[0.02] 
Japan  No episodes of systemic crisis  
Netherlands  No episodes of systemic crisis  
Spain  No episodes of systemic crisis  
Sweden  No episodes of systemic crisis  
UK 0.36*** 
(3.86) 
-0.53*** 
(-3.93) 
[0.10] -0.01 
(-0.08) 
-0.34*** 
(-2.49) 
[0.07] 
US 0.89*** 
(7.81) 
-1.05*** 
(-4.83) 
[0.32] -0.51*** 
(-8.34) 
-0.06 
(-0.22) 
[0.28] 
Notes: Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. *, **, *** - statistically significant at 
the 10, 5, and 1% level respectively. 
 
6.2. Non-systemic crises 
Finally, I analyse the impact of non-systemic systemic crises, and estimate the 
following models: 
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where NonSystemicCrisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 in the presence 
of an episode of non-systemic crisis and 0 otherwise, and H refers to the number of 
ahead periods in the forecasting exercise. Similarly to the case of systemic crisis, I allow 
for a lag in the transmission of the effects of non-systemic crises to financial markets 
and consider H=4. 
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Table 7.1 reports the estimates from 4 quarters-ahead forecasting regressions. 
The results are somewhat weaker than previously. Nevertheless, the coefficient 
associated with the interaction between rwy or wy and the dummy variable for the 
systemic crisis is statistically significant and has a sign that is consistent with the one 
associated with rwy or wy in the case of Finland. This implies that, in the outcome of a 
systemic crisis, investors to demand a higher risk premium. 
 
Table 7.1 – Real stock returns and non-systemic crises. 
 rwyt-1 rwyt-1 * 
NonSystemicCrisis 
Adj. 
R-square 
wyt-1 wyt-1 * 
NonSystemicCrisis 
Adj. 
R-square 
Australia  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Austria  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Belgium  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Canada  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Denmark  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Finland -0.42*** 
(-2.68) 
-1.74*** 
(-3.04) 
[0.12] -1.31** 
(-2.23) 
0.28 
(0.33) 
[0.10] 
France  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Germany  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Ireland  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Italy  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Japan 0.00 
(0.02) 
0.69** 
(2.13) 
[0.04] -0.22 
(-0.87) 
0.85** 
(2.21) 
[0.04] 
Netherlands  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Spain  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Sweden 0.57*** 
(3.69) 
-0.47 
(-1.40) 
[0.12] -1.20*** 
(-4.34) 
0.36 
(0.81) 
[0.18] 
UK  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
US  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Notes: Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 10, 
5, and 1% level respectively. 
 
Table 7.2 shows the estimates from 4 quarters-ahead forecasting regressions, 
following the models: 
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The results suggest again that both the point coefficient estimates of rwy and wy 
and their statistical significance do not change with respect to the previous findings. In 
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contrast with the case of stocks, the coefficient associated to NonSystemicCrisis has the 
opposite sign of the one associated with rwy or wy, implying that the occurrence of a 
systemic crisis leads investors to demand a higher risk premium for government bonds 
as they interpret that situation as an increase of sovereign default.  
 
Table 7.2 – Real bond returns and non-systemic crises. 
 rwyt-1 rwyt-1 * 
NonSystemicCrisis 
Adj. 
R-square 
wyt-1 wyt-1 * 
NonSystemicCrisis 
Adj. 
R-square 
Australia  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Austria  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Belgium  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Canada  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Denmark  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Finland -0.32*** 
(-4.58) 
-1.84*** 
(-6.36) 
[0.24] -1.15*** 
(-4.17) 
0.12 
(0.40) 
[0.28] 
France  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Germany  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Ireland  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Italy  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Japan -0.13*** 
(-2.58) 
1.13*** 
(12.20) 
[0.58] -0.15** 
(-2.46) 
1.21*** 
(10.90) 
[0.60] 
Netherlands  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Spain  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Sweden 0.12** 
(2.06) 
-0.09 
(-1.03) 
[0.04] -0.51*** 
(-6.21) 
0.15 
(1.10) 
[0.28] 
UK  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
US  No episodes of non-systemic crisis  
Notes: Newey-West corrected t-statistics appear in parenthesis. *, **, *** - statistically significant at the 
10, 5, and 1% level respectively. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The current financial crisis has highlighted the strong connections between the 
financial system, the housing sector, and the banking sector not only in domestic terms, 
but also when considering inter-country dimensions. In fact, as Mallick and Mohsin 
(2007, 2010) note, monetary policy can be crucial, in particular, if it targets financial 
conditions (Castro, 2008; Sousa, 2010b). Those linkages, in turn, can be responsible for 
important wealth dynamics (Mathur and De, 1989; Mathur and Waheed, 1991). 
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This paper explores the predictive power of the trend deviations among asset 
wealth and human wealth (summarized by the variables rwy and wy) for expected future 
asset returns. 
The above-mentioned common trends summarize agent's expectations of stock 
returns and government bond yields. In particular, when the wealth-to-income ratio falls 
(increases), forward-looking investors will demand a higher (lower) risk premium given 
that they will be exposed to larger (smaller) idiosyncratic shocks. 
As for bond returns, if government bonds are seen as a component of asset 
wealth, then investors behave in the same manner when they observe a fall in the 
wealth-to-income ratio. If, however, the increase in government bond returns is 
perceived as a symptom of public finance deterioration (and, consequently, as a rise in 
future taxes), then investors will interpret the fall in the wealth-to-income ratio as a fall 
in future bond risk premium. 
Using data for sixteen industrialized countries, I show that the predictive power 
of rwy and wy for real stock returns is particularly strong at horizons from 4 to 8 
quarters. 
In what concerns bond returns, the analysis suggests that one can cluster the set 
of countries in two groups: (i) in the case of Australia, Finland and Netherlands, there is 
evidence suggesting that investors behave in a non-Ricardian way; and (ii) in the case of 
Germany and Italy, investors seem to be forward-looking and act in a Ricardian manner. 
Finally, I show that systemic crises amplify housing market shocks and their 
transmission to the financial system. 
The present work opens new avenues of investigation. In this context, Gabriel et 
al. (2008) emphasize the importance of the formulation of a nonlinear relationship, and 
suggest that short-term deviations in the consumption-wealth ratio may forecast both 
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asset returns and consumption growth. As a result, a nonlinear adjustment may 
contribute to a better explanation of the fluctuations in the wealth-to-income ratio and to 
improve the predictability of asset returns. I leave that line of research for the future. 
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